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HTLAW / ArticlesEvidence LawJuly 26, 2026 · Hyder Talpur
Evidence / Synthetic mediaExhibit: a recording

It looks real.
Prove it.

A perfect copy can preserve a fabricated event. Pakistani courts need to establish what the recording proves, and how.

FILE / 001
Integrity verified ≠ event verified
In this article 6 chapters + sources
01 / A video arrives

A video shows someone speaking.
Did they actually say it?

Imagine a video that appears to show a shop owner agreeing to pay a bribe. Someone sends it to the police. The owner says the video is fake.

Fictional example · not a real recording
The clip appears to show:
“I’ll pay you to approve it.”
The owner’s response: “That is my face, but I never said those words.”

A deepfake is a synthetic or manipulated image, audio recording or video that makes someone appear to say or do something that was not authentically recorded. AI can replace a face, clone a voice, generate speech or change lip movements. Different techniques leave different clues, so there is no single test that settles every disputed clip.2

NIST, the US National Institute of Standards and Technology, explains why several technical checks must work together. A record of where a file came from can help trace its history. A watermark, a marker embedded in the content, can help identify its origin. A detector looks for signs of synthesis. None answers every question: a missing history does not prove a fake, and a missing watermark does not prove a real recording.2

Start with a surprisingly important distinction: keeping a file unchanged is not the same as proving it was true in the first place.

02 / Check the copy

A perfect copy of a fake
is still a fake.

Suppose, just for this demonstration, that someone created the shop owner’s video using AI. The police save that file. Later, they bring an exact copy to court.

Watch what copying does, and does not, prove.This demonstration starts with a made-up video.
File saved by policeMade-up videoFILE A
Copy brought to courtSame made-up videoFILE A
What happens between saving the file and bringing it to court?

The two files match. That supports “nobody changed this copy after it was saved.” It does not support “the owner really said those words.”

FILE A and FILE B are illustration labels, not real test results.
A useful term

A hash is a code calculated from a file’s contents. Comparing hashes helps check whether two copies match. It does not tell you whether the conversation in the video ever happened.

Keep three questions separate. File identity: is this the file the police collected? Integrity: has it changed since collection? Truth of depiction: does it show the owner’s actual conversation? A record of who handled the file helps with the first question. Hashes and file information help with the second. Neither, on its own, answers the third.

What the evidence rules actually do

The law makes similar distinctions. Admissibility concerns whether material may be received as evidence. Weight concerns how much reliance the court should place on it. Getting a video before the court does not settle whether the owner said the words.3

Article 46-AIs the electronic statement relevant?
Statements in electronic documents generated, received or recorded by an automated information system are relevant when the system was working properly. This does not itself prove that the depicted event happened.3
Article 73Does the output count as primary evidence?
Certain electronic outputs qualify as primary evidence when the statutory conditions are met. Explanation 3 presumes the automated system was working properly unless there is evidence to the contrary; Explanation 4 addresses reproductions to which a security procedure was applied. Neither makes an invented scene true.3
Article 78-AIs the alleged maker or signature disputed?
Where someone is alleged to have generated or electronically signed a document and denies it, the application of a security procedure must be proved. This is not an automatic rule attributing an unsigned video to the person whose face appears in it.3
Article 59Can an expert help answer the question?
Expert opinion is relevant to an electronic document’s authenticity and integrity and to the functioning, programming or operation of an information system. The court must still examine whether the expert’s method supports the conclusion.3
Article 164May the court receive modern-device evidence?
The text retrieved from Pakistan Code refers to evidence or witnesses recorded by the court through modern devices, expressly including video calls and conferencing. Earlier cases discuss its previous wording. Neither version should be read as automatically establishing a disputed file’s authenticity.3

The Electronic Transactions Ordinance 2002 also explains why an “original” file need not depict a true event. Section 5 addresses reliable assurance that a record has remained complete and unaltered since it was first generated in final form, and that it can be displayed legibly. Our made-up video could remain unchanged from that point without becoming a real conversation.4

Section 6 addresses keeping the record accessible, preserving an accurate representation of its original form, and retaining origin, destination, date and time information where applicable. These requirements help establish the record’s history. They do not establish the truth of the scene created at the beginning of that history.4

03 / Find the beginning

Who recorded it?
And how did it get here?

Back to the disputed video. The person who sent it to the police may only have received it from someone else. Forwarding a clip does not make that person a witness to the conversation.

Work backwards from the copy in court.
  1. Court copyWho supplied this file?
  2. Sender’s phoneDid they record it or forward it?
  3. Original recorderWhere, when and how was it recorded?

If the trail stops at “someone sent it to me,” the source still needs explaining. That gap does not, by itself, prove the clip is fake.

The legal term

Authentication means establishing that the recording is what the person relying on it claims it is. Here, the claim is that it records the shop owner’s actual conversation.

The Supreme Court has already faced this problem

In Ishtiaq Ahmed Mirza v Federation of Pakistan, PLD 2019 SC 675, decided on 23 August 2019, the Supreme Court considered a disputed video and brought together safeguards from earlier cases. It warned that reliance without forensic examination was becoming “more and more unsafe”. The petitions were disposed of; the Court did not itself authenticate the disputed video or overturn the underlying conviction.5

Applied to our example, the checklist asks for much more than a file played on a screen:

  1. Establish a real recording. Prove that the material is genuine, untampered and an actual record of the conversation or event, not a manufactured representation.
  2. Account for the recorder and source. Produce the recording through its recorder and disclose where it came from and when it was acquired.
  3. Let the court examine it. Play it in court, establish sufficient clarity, identify the voices or people and explain its relevance.
  4. Show how it was kept. Establish safe custody and address delay in producing it. An unexplained delay calls for caution.
  5. Check the transcript as well. A transcription should be prepared under independent supervision. Written words should not quietly substitute for unclear or disputed audio.
  6. Test for manipulation. Forensic examination must address whether the recording has been edited, doctored or otherwise tampered with.5

This is a condensed reading of the safeguards, not the entire checklist. The judgment also requires a formal application to bring the recording on record and cautions about recording to lay a trap to procure evidence. Its discussion of a Punjab forensic report being admissible under the then-applicable statute must not be confused with a finding that every recording it examines is true.5

A fixed camera, a platform export and a forwarded message have different origins. Applying the safeguards requires attention to those differences, not treating Article 164 as an exemption from proof. This article’s practical approach is to identify the claim, obtain the best source, examine its history and content, look for separate support, and allow the other side to test it. That is an application of existing safeguards, not a new statutory test.5

For this video, collect the history as well as the picture

Start by stating exactly what is being proved: the owner’s identity, the words, the place, a state of mind, publication, or simply the existence of a circulating clip. Then seek the native file, meaning the file from its original recording or storage system, where available. A screen recording or compressed messaging copy may leave important questions unanswered.

The collecting witness should explain the device or account, the export process, the date of collection and every later transfer. Preserve device identifiers, timestamps, platform logs and hashes. Record each conversion, enhancement and transcription so that the court can understand which version it is examining.54

Continuity asks whether the court has the file that was collected. Provenance asks how that file came into existence. For the second question, useful material may include the capture device, original storage, account history, earlier versions, cloud records and a person who was present. File metadata, information stored about the file such as dates or device details, may also help. A match between collection and trial cannot explain what happened before collection.

Preserve it before the source disappears

For an investigation under PECA, careful handling is not just good advice. Sections 31, 35 and 36 provide concrete preservation, search and access safeguards. Applied to our example, the aim is to keep the source video available and leave a record of what investigators did to it.11

  1. Keep the data available

    Under section 31, an authorised officer needs specified data reasonably required for a criminal investigation and a risk of its loss, alteration, destruction or inaccessibility. A written notice can require provision or preservation for up to 90 days. Acquisition must be reported to the court immediately, and no later than 24 hours; the court can extend preservation.

  2. Record what is done to it

    Section 35 requires proportionality, protection of integrity and secrecy, and efforts to maintain the chain of custody through technical measures. Copy only relevant data, keep action logs and avoid unnecessary disruption. Physical seizure is a last resort where technical measures are unavailable or insufficient.

  3. Make seizure and access accountable

    Section 36 requires a dated, timed seizure list and a copy for the specified person. The owner or authorised agent can apply, at prescribed cost, for a forensic image: an evidential copy of the data. If the officer seeks to withhold it to prevent prejudice to an investigation or proceedings, the officer must approach the court within seven days of that application. The court must give written reasons for its order.

These powers operate within PECA and its conditions. The owner’s section 36 route is not an unconditional right for anyone to obtain every file; fair-trial disclosure is a related but separate question.11

04 / Look beyond this clip

Does anything else show
the conversation happened?

An expert examines the best available file for signs of manipulation and explains what the tests can and cannot show. But the investigation should also look beyond the video. Corroboration means other evidence that supports a claim. Here, useful support needs to address whether the owner’s conversation happened.

Suppose ten people share the same clip. That is ten copies of one claim, not ten separate recordings of the conversation.

Which item adds a separate source?Select an example to see why the difference matters.
Still one source.

Everyone may be sharing the same fabricated video. Repetition does not independently confirm the conversation.

These are examples of questions to investigate, not findings about an actual case.

Another camera might confirm or contradict the conversation, but its source, timing and authenticity also need checking. A witness who was there has knowledge separate from the clip, although their reliability must still be tested. A witness who merely watched the same video adds no independent observation of the event.

The same approach applies to location records, messages sent at the time, possession of the device and conduct before or after the event. Ask whether each item comes from a genuinely separate source, and whether it supports or contradicts the specific claim. More copies are not more independent proof.

And a separate record needs proof of its own. In Khair Muhammad v The State, 2025 SCP 199, the Supreme Court found serious problems with the phone records: the users and SIMs were not established, names had been added by hand, and company authentication mattered. The Court said a CDR “must bear the endorsement/authentication” of its issuing telecom company. The appellants were acquitted on the overall doubtful record, not because phone records can never be used.14

For our video, the lesson is specific: a printout bearing the owner’s name does not, by itself, prove that the owner used that number, was at the scene or spoke the recorded words.

What should the expert actually examine?

The technical question is not just “was this file edited?” It is whether the file truthfully represents the claimed person and event. Depending on the available material, an examiner may study the camera’s sensor traces, how the file was encoded, breaks between frames, lighting and reflections, lip and voice timing, background sound, compression history and unusual metadata. Comparisons with authenticated images or voice samples may also help.

The report needs to explain the chosen method, software version, data, limitations and alternative explanations. Under Article 59, expertise makes an opinion relevant; it does not make the expert the judge. The court still needs to consider qualifications, whether the test can be repeated, its error rate and whether the conclusion goes further than the test allows.8

A useful report says exactly what was found.Illustrative conclusions, not results from the fictional video.
“The file matches the collected copy.”
This addresses continuity after collection. It does not establish whether the original conversation happened.
“Features are consistent with synthesis.”
The examiner must explain the features, the method’s reliability and whether an ordinary process could produce similar results.
“This copy is too compressed to assess reliably.”
The material may not support a confident conclusion. An inconclusive result is not a certificate of authenticity.

Detectors can perform differently when generators, editing or compression change. A tool may miss a new kind of synthetic content or flag ordinary processing. That is why a percentage alone should not decide the case.2 Human examiners can overstate their findings too. A careful conclusion identifies what remains unknown.

Independence also matters. For offences under PECA, section 40 requires an electronic-evidence forensic laboratory independent of the investigation agency. The investigator collecting the evidence should not simply become its final validator.8

The owner must be able to challenge the testing

Article 10-A of the Constitution guarantees fair trial and due process.7 In this setting, a meaningful opportunity to challenge the evidence means access to the media, relevant metadata, extraction notes, hashes and expert report, with enough time for independent analysis. The opposing party needs to be able to test the reasoning, not merely read the examiner’s conclusion.

If the State uses proprietary software, this article’s proposed approach is to require, at minimum, the validated methodology, limitations and outputs needed for a meaningful challenge. A certificate saying “forensically verified” deserves little weight if no one can test the process behind it. This follows the fair-trial principle; it is not a claim that Article 10-A specifies a particular software-disclosure format.7

What happened when those safeguards were missing?

Supreme Court · Bail stage

A recorded confession was not enough

In Abdul Wahid v The State, 2022 SCP 220, an alleged jail interview was relied on as a confession. The video’s maker was not listed as a witness and no forensic test had been conducted. The Court said it must be “proved in accordance with law” before it can be treated as evidence.12

Outcome: post-arrest bail granted because the whole record called for further inquiry into guilt. This was not an acquittal or a finding that AI made the video.

Supreme Court · Conviction appeal

Unclear words could not become clear proof

In Rajesh alias Rajoo v The State, 2025 SCP 258, a recorded dying declaration was not properly audible, there were concerns about prompting, and no forensic examination established its genuineness. The Court found it “not safe to rely upon said recording”.13

Outcome: conviction set aside and acquittal, on the combined doubts in the case. This was a recording-reliability decision, not a finding of a deepfake.

05 / Ask what the video is being used to prove

A fake video can still be
evidence of a different event.

Now imagine the investigation establishes that the owner’s words were fabricated. The clip cannot prove that the owner said them. But it may help show that someone circulated a fabricated accusation about the owner.

Same video. Two different claims.
1

“The owner agreed to a bribe.”

A fabricated conversation does not prove this.

The fake clip cannot establish those words were spoken.
2

“Someone posted a fake about the owner.”

The clip may be relevant to this different allegation.

Still prove who posted it, where and under what circumstances.

The offence and the evidence are separate questions

The Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act 2016, usually called PECA, defines electronic offences and investigative powers. The Qanun-e-Shahadat governs proof. A harmful-looking clip does not remove the need to establish either the elements of an offence or the reliability of the evidence.91

The provisions below illustrate the distinction. This is a focused discussion, not an exhaustive catalogue of offences involving synthetic media:

Section 20False information harming a person
This provision addresses intentional, public transmission of information known to be false that intimidates or harms a natural person’s reputation or privacy. In a fabricated-accusation case, those requirements need evidence; showing an unpleasant video is not enough.9
Section 21Sexually explicit manipulation and related conduct
This provision specifically includes superimposing a person’s face over sexually explicit imagery, alongside related sexual depiction and intimidation. The particular conduct and the statutory purpose or other elements relied on must be established.9
Section 26A counterfeit source presented as authentic
Spoofing involves dishonest intention and a website or information carrying a counterfeit source intended to be believed authentic. Whether a particular deepfake falls within it depends on the facts. An image of someone’s face is not, by itself, proof that they created or published the file.9
Section 13False data intended to be used as authentic
Electronic forgery addresses interference with or use of a system, device or data, with the specified injurious or fraudulent intent, producing unauthentic data intended to be considered or acted on for legal purposes as authentic. A fabricated video made to support a false legal claim makes this provision worth examining. The prosecution must prove those requirements; fabrication alone does not complete the offence.16

For our owner’s video, investigators therefore need to establish who made or published it, the relevant account and transmission history, and the knowledge, purpose, harm or public transmission required by the provision charged. A fabricated clip may help prove publication of a fabrication if publication and the chain of evidence are independently proved. It cannot prove the invented words were spoken.

There is also a constitutional caution around section 20. In the separate case Meera Shafi v Federation of Pakistan, 2022 SCMR 1267, the Supreme Court granted leave to consider, among other questions, whether criminalising defamation violates freedom of expression, and stayed the particular criminal proceedings until the next hearing. “Leave to appeal is granted” is not a final ruling that section 20 is valid or invalid. That 2022 order, by itself, does not settle the provision’s final constitutional status.17

06 / Put the answers together

“It looks real” is not enough.
Neither is “it could be AI.”

There are two risks. A fabricated clip may be accepted because it looks convincing. A genuine clip may be dismissed because someone says “AI can do that now.” The latter is sometimes called the liar’s dividend: the existence of fakes makes it easier to deny real evidence.

The answer is not to presume every recording false. The party relying on the video retains the ordinary responsibility to establish its relevance, source and authenticity. A bare allegation of deepfaking does not automatically shift that responsibility or establish fabrication.15

A concrete challenge is different. Unexplained editing, a broken handling history, signs of synthesis or an impossible setting give the court something specific to investigate. This article argues for forensic proof proportionate to that problem, the stakes and the video’s importance to the result.

For the shop owner’s video, the useful questions are now concrete.
  1. Who made the recording, and what do they know about it?
  2. Which file was collected, and what happened to it afterwards?
  3. What can technical testing actually establish?
  4. Does separate evidence support or contradict the conversation?
  5. Has the other side had a fair chance to test the claim?

If this recording is the only evidence of a decisive fact, an unexplained origin or material forensic uncertainty may prevent proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. If independent evidence already proves the event and the video merely adds to it, a defect may instead affect how much weight the video receives. That does not excuse a failure to satisfy the requirements for admitting it.5

For the shop owner, neither the familiar face nor the denial settles the case. The court needs a clear claim, the best available file, an explained history, testing that acknowledges its limits, any separate supporting or contradicting evidence, and a fair opportunity to challenge it. Existing evidence law provides the foundation. Deepfakes make careful application more important.157

The idea to keep

Showing that a video exists is easy.
Showing what it proves takes evidence.

The source record

Bibliography

Cases

Legislation

Other Materials

Footnotes

  1. Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984, arts 46-A, 59, 73, 78-A and 164. ↩

  2. Bilva Chandra and others, Reducing Risks Posed by Synthetic Content: An Overview of Technical Approaches to Digital Content Transparency, NIST AI 100-4, November 2024, pp 3-7, 18-32. ↩

  3. Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984, arts 46-A, 59, 73 (especially Explanations 3-4), 78-A and 164. The Pakistan Code text of art 164 contains wording about evidence or witnesses recorded by the court, including video calls and conferencing; the earlier judgments discuss the wording then in force. Check the applicable version before relying on a verbatim statutory quotation. ↩

  4. Electronic Transactions Ordinance 2002, ss 5-6. Section 5’s integrity assessment allows endorsements and changes arising in the normal course of communication, storage and display; it is not a rule prohibiting every technical change. ↩

  5. Ishtiaq Ahmed Mirza v Federation of Pakistan, PLD 2019 SC 675, Constitution Petitions Nos 10-12 of 2019, decided 23 August 2019, paras 8-11 (SC). Petitions disposed of. The 21-point checklist in para 11 is also reproduced in Shabbir Hussain v The State, 2024 LHC 5071 / PLJ 2025 Cr.C. 1. ↩

  6. Meera Shafi v Ali Zafar, PLD 2023 SC 211, Civil Petition No 1795 of 2022, decided 21 November 2022, paras 13-24 (SC). Appeal allowed; remaining cross-examination by video conference permitted with appropriate safeguards. Official judgment. ↩

  7. Constitution of Pakistan 1973, art 10-A. The article’s proposed technical-disclosure approach is an application of fair-trial principles, not express software-disclosure wording in art 10-A. ↩

  8. Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984, art 59; Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act 2016, s 40 (establishment or designation of an electronic-evidence forensic laboratory independent of the investigation agency). ↩

  9. Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act 2016, ss 20-21 and 26. Each provision has its own conduct and intent requirements; s 26 expressly requires dishonest intention. Section 20 also contains a proviso for material aired by a PEMRA-licensed broadcast or distribution service. This discussion is not an exhaustive catalogue of PECA offences or exemptions; see also note 17 on the constitutional leave order. ↩

  10. Electronic Transactions Ordinance 2002, ss 2(d), 2(f), 2(q) and 9. Section 9’s presumptions are rebuttable and relate to qualifying advanced electronic signatures and associated documents; distinguishing these matters from truth of depiction is this article’s analysis. ↩

  11. Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act 2016, ss 31(1)-(3), 35(2)-(3) and 36(1)-(5). Preservation requires the statutory investigative need and risk conditions; a court may extend the preservation period. The s 36 forensic-image route is for the owner or authorised agent, on application and prescribed costs, subject to the specified court process—not unrestricted disclosure to anyone. ↩

  12. Abdul Wahid v The State, 2022 SCP 220, decided 27 July 2022, paras 6-7 (SC). Post-arrest bail granted on further-inquiry grounds, including defects in the alleged recorded confession and other evidence; no final finding of innocence or AI manipulation. ↩

  13. Rajesh alias Rajoo v The State, 2025 SCP 258, decided 9 July 2025, paras 7, 11-12 and 15 (SC). Conviction set aside and acquittal on the combined doubts, including defects in the recorded dying declaration. ↩

  14. Khair Muhammad and another v The State, 2025 SCP 199, short order dated 30 April 2025, paras 14-16 and 19-20 (SC). Call-detail records, SIM attribution and telecom authentication; acquittal based on the overall doubtful record. ↩

  15. Mian Khalid Perviz v The State through Special Prosecutor ANF, 2021 SCMR 522, paras 6-8 (SC). Defence call and vehicle-tracking records lacked the necessary evidential links; appeal dismissed. ↩

  16. Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act 2016, s 13. The false-legal-claim video is an illustrative application, not a reported holding that every deepfake constitutes electronic forgery. ↩

  17. Meera Shafi and others v Federation of Pakistan, 2022 SCMR 1267, decided 8 June 2022, para 4 and order on CMA No 3523 of 2022 (SC). Leave granted to consider constitutional questions; the particular criminal proceedings were stayed until the next hearing. The order does not establish a final constitutional ruling or an indefinite stay. ↩