A whole city.
One order.
When a network is restricted, the State has to explain the power, the reasons and the reach of its decision.
In this article 6 chapters + sources
Start with what stopped working.
A platform block, a local mobile suspension and a general shutdown do different things. The legal record should describe the actual restriction.
The legal issue
Mobile data stops working across a district. A shop cannot confirm payment. A journalist cannot send a report. A family cannot open an official warning.
One restriction can affect several rights at once.1
Pakistan does not guarantee absolutely uninterrupted connectivity. But a shutdown needs a legal source and must stay within that power’s purpose and limits.
The Supreme Court’s CM Pak decision permits some temporary, localised and event-specific restrictions under section 8(2)(c) of the Telecom Act.2
That is different from the broader emergency power in section 54(3).
The question is therefore not just “can government ever suspend service?” It is “was this restriction, in this place, for this period, lawfully justified?”
What counts as a shutdown?
A shutdown intentionally makes internet or electronic communication inaccessible or effectively unusable for a population or location.
It can take different forms. Mobile data may stop while calls continue. All cellular services may be disabled locally. Severe slowing may make a working connection practically useless.
Describe what actually stopped
An item: blocking particular unlawful content.
A service: disabling a platform.
A network: suspending mobile data across a district or province.
Those measures are not interchangeable. Their reach into lawful activity differs, so the reasons need to address the actual measure.
The UN human-rights report warns that a “mobile-only” restriction can amount to a practical blackout where people depend on mobile broadband.3
Judge the burden as users experience it, not just as the order labels it.
The burden travels across ordinary life.
Expression and publication.
Information, communication and access.
Trade and economic participation.
The rights engaged at once
Article 18: a payment cannot go through
Article 18 protects lawful professions, occupations, trade and business, subject to permitted regulation.4
Operators lose licensed service and contractual activity. Users may lose orders, delivery routes, client work, banking channels or ordinary business communication.
Economic loss alone does not make a shutdown unconstitutional. But broad or repeated disablement needs an explanation of why narrower regulation would not address the risk.
Article 19: a report cannot be sent
Article 19 protects expression and the press, subject to reasonable restrictions imposed by law for the listed purposes.5
A network shutdown affects lawful journalism, criticism, family messages, emergency reporting and commercial speech together. It does not first separate unlawful speech from lawful speech.
Suppose the identified risk concerns one place for two hours. Why suspend a province for a day? If voice calls are unrelated to the risk, why disable those too?
These are illustrative questions, not findings about a particular order. A serious purpose does not by itself justify every service, area or duration.
Article 19-A: a warning cannot be opened
Article 19-A concerns access to information of public importance, subject to regulation and reasonable legal restrictions.6
Networks carry official warnings, election information, health guidance, court orders and public-interest reporting. A restriction can obstruct receiving information as well as publishing it.
An online explanation is of little help to people who cannot get online. This article argues for effective disclosure: advance publication where possible, or prompt offline availability where advance notice would defeat the legitimate purpose.
Which law authorizes a shutdown?
Read the Telecom Act as a whole.
Section 6 addresses licensees’ rights, open and fair decisions, consistency, transparency, notice, hearing and users’ interests.
- Islamabad High CourtSuspension tied to emergency powerCM Pak: section 54(3) treated as the specific route.Set aside on appeal
- Supreme CourtTwo powers, different fieldsSection 8(2)(c): temporary, localised, event-specific disruption.Section 54(3): broader emergency suspension.Governing appellate result
Section 8 permits Federal Government policy directives to the Authority, consistent with the Act. Section 8(2)(c) includes national-security requirements and external relations.7
Section 54 contains three different powers
- Subsection (1): interception and tracing of calls.
- Subsection (2): government preference and priority in telecommunications in specified grave circumstances.
- Subsection (3): suspension or modification of orders or licences, or suspension of licensee operations, functions or services, on a presidential emergency proclamation.8
Section 8(2A) also permits Cabinet or authorised-committee policy directives on telecommunications matters. Those too must be consistent with the Act.9
Identify who actually decided, what instrument they used and which conditions apply. A broad policy power does not answer all three.
Read alone, section 54(3) suggests an emergency is needed for suspension. Whether it governed every restriction was the dispute in CM Pak.
What the litigation established
The High Court: use the specific emergency power
The Islamabad High Court treated section 54(3) as the specific suspension provision. It held that section 8 could not bypass its emergency condition.
It declared inconsistent suspension directions unlawful.10 That judgment was later set aside. It is not the governing outcome.
The Supreme Court: the powers operate in different fields
The Supreme Court distinguished extensive or prolonged emergency suspension from pre-emptive, event-specific, temporary and localised disruption under section 8(2)(c).
It treated the 2009 policy directive as delegated legislation and required assessment of the particular exercise for reasonableness and fairness.11
Outcome: the government’s appeals succeeded; the High Court judgment was set aside.
What limits survived?
Consistency: section 8 remains subject to the Act.
Scale: the reasoning concerned limited places and periods. An indefinite, recurring or expansive blackout weakens the premise for distinguishing that power from emergency suspension.
Lawful exercise: section 24-A requires reasonableness, fairness, justice and advancement of the enactment’s purposes, with reasons where necessary or appropriate.12
The judgment does not make every security-labelled order immune from review. But paragraph 8 also limits judicial interference outside those parameters. It does not invite judges to substitute their preferred security policy.
The route to court mattered
Paragraph 9 said the licensee should first have raised its grievance about the manner of exercise with the Federal Government. Immediate recourse to court was premature.11
A challenge therefore needs both a legal defect and the appropriate procedural route.
Show the decision.
Four parts of a reasoned order, with the question each must answer.
01Authority
Identify the statute, competent decision-maker and conditions activating the power.
02Reasons
Connect the facts relied on to the threat and the chosen restriction.
03Boundaries
Identify the affected area, service and period. Explain why those boundaries are necessary.
04Review
Identify when the restriction ends or is reconsidered, and what would justify continuation.
A workable test for shutdown orders
The six questions below are this article’s application of the law. They are not a six-part test quoted from the Supreme Court.
1. Who made the decision?
Identify the competent decision-maker and operative instrument. A request from another body is not itself a statutory order.
Section 8 concerns a policy directive to the Authority; the Authority must act within the Act and applicable directive.
2. What supported the threat assessment?
Identify the material available when the order was made.
Not every operational detail must be disclosed publicly. But material must be capable of judicial examination. Repeating the same formula for different dates and districts does not show an individual assessment.
3. Why this service?
Mobile data, SMS, voice calls, fixed broadband and a platform do different things.
Explain the connection between the selected service and the risk. Do not assume that a reason to restrict one justifies restricting all.
4. Why this area?
Identify the radius, district or province and why it was necessary.
Technical limits may affect targeting. If so, explain them and the alternatives considered. Network convenience is not, by itself, a legal justification for an unnecessarily broad restriction.
5. For how long?
State the start and end. An open-ended order risks continuing through inertia.
This article’s proposed discipline is fresh material and a fresh recorded decision for an extension, rather than treating the original reason as permanent.
6. How can the decision be understood and challenged?
Section 24-A addresses reasons and a copy for the adversely affected person where necessary or appropriate. Section 6 adds transparency, notice, hearing and user protection.13
Urgency may make advance notice impossible. It does not itself justify permanent secrecy. The proposed approach is prompt effective disclosure when the risk passes and a usable route to challenge the continuing restriction or seek appropriate relief.
Choose the appeal route by the decision-maker
| Decision challenged | Statutory route under section 7 | Period |
|---|---|---|
| PTA decision or order alleged to be contrary to the Act | Appeal to the Tribunal | Within thirty days of receipt; ninety days specified for decision |
| PTA officer exercising delegated powers | Appeal to the Authority | Within thirty days; thirty days specified for decision |
A challenge to a federal policy directive is not automatically the same as either appeal.14 Identify jurisdiction and the applicable procedure before choosing the forum.
- PTA decision or order
- Appeal to the Tribunal within 30 days of receipt, on the statutory ground.
- Delegated officer's decision
- Appeal to the Authority within 30 days of receipt.
- Federal policy directive
- Do not assume section 7 is the same route. Identify the remedy and the required prior approach.
Section 7 · C.M. Pak, paragraph 9. This map explains routes; it does not determine jurisdiction in an individual case.
The scope requires its own explanation.
Ask whether the selected service is connected to the threat, and what lawful activity depends on it.
Schematic comparison. The blocks show possible dependencies, not measured losses or a conclusion on legality.Why aggregate harm matters
Return to the shop, journalist and family. The operator’s revenue is only part of what has been lost.
Many small losses can create a large public burden. Missed wages, unreceived payments, inaccessible court updates, lost consultations and interrupted reporting may each be too costly to litigate individually.
The assessment should consider emergency communication, accessibility, public information and reliance on mobile services as well as expected security benefit.
Frequency matters too. Repeated interruptions require an explanation of their cumulative effect, not just a fresh description of each as exceptional.
Why narrower measures matter
The proposed constitutional discipline is practical: consider a measure that addresses the demonstrated risk while restricting fewer rights.
Depending on the facts, that could mean a smaller area, shorter period, one service instead of all communications, preserved emergency numbers, verified public information or lawful action against particular content.
Physical or cyber-security measures may sometimes address the risk without disabling the network.
Courts need not design the operation. The decision-maker should explain which alternatives were considered and why they were inadequate.
The words temporary, localised and event-specific must describe the restriction that was actually imposed.
An order should contain the grounds for ending it.
What follows
Some shutdowns are permitted. An unlimited power to suspend ordinary communication is not what the governing case recognised.
CM Pak distinguishes section 8(2)(c) from the emergency power in section 54(3), while retaining consistency with the Act and section 24-A controls.
Articles 18, 19 and 19-A explain why the effects on trade, expression and information matter.
For the district without data, ask: who decided, on what material, affecting which service and area, until when, and subject to what review?
Public safety is a serious purpose. The decision taken in its name must still be legally accountable.
Bibliography
Cases
- CM Pak Ltd v Pakistan Telecommunication Authority PLD 2018 Islamabad 243. Official judgment.
- Ministry of Information Technology and Telecommunications v C.M. Pak (Pvt) Ltd, PLD 2020 SC 551, decided 22 April 2020 (SC).
Legislation
- Constitution of Pakistan 1973, arts 18, 19 and 19-A.
- General Clauses Act 1897, s 24-A.
- Pakistan Telecommunication (Re-organization) Act 1996, ss 6-8 and 54.
Other Materials
- Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Internet Shutdowns: Trends, Causes, Legal Implications and Impacts on a Range of Human Rights, A/HRC/50/55, 13 May 2022.
- Ministry of Law and Justice, Pakistan Code.
Footnotes
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Constitution of Pakistan 1973, arts 18, 19 and 19-A. ↩
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Pakistan Telecommunication (Re-organization) Act 1996, ss 8 and 54; General Clauses Act 1897, s 24-A. ↩
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Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Internet Shutdowns: Trends, Causes, Legal Implications and Impacts on a Range of Human Rights, A/HRC/50/55, 13 May 2022, paras 5-15 and 50-59. ↩
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Constitution of Pakistan 1973, art 18. ↩
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Constitution of Pakistan 1973, art 19. ↩
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Constitution of Pakistan 1973, art 19-A. ↩
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Pakistan Telecommunication (Re-organization) Act 1996, ss 6 and 8. ↩
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Pakistan Telecommunication (Re-organization) Act 1996, s 54. ↩
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Pakistan Telecommunication (Re-organization) Act 1996, s 8(2A), read with ss 8(1), 8(2)(c) and 54. ↩
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CM Pak Ltd v Pakistan Telecommunication Authority PLD 2018 Islamabad 243, paras 9-14. The judgment was later set aside and is discussed only to identify the rejected construction. ↩
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Ministry of Information Technology and Telecommunications v C.M. Pak (Pvt) Ltd, PLD 2020 SC 551 / 2020 SCP 142, Civil Appeals Nos 977-978 of 2018, decided 22 April 2020 (SC), paras 5-9. Appeals allowed; High Court judgment set aside. Paragraphs 8-9 address limits on judicial interference and the licensee’s premature route to court. ↩ ↩2
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General Clauses Act 1897, s 24-A; Ministry of Information Technology (n 10), paras 6-9. ↩
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Pakistan Telecommunication (Re-organization) Act 1996, s 6; General Clauses Act 1897, s 24-A(2). ↩
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Pakistan Telecommunication (Re-organization) Act 1996, s 7(1)-(3). The Tribunal appeal concerns an Authority decision or order challenged as contrary to the Act; the delegated-officer route is to the Authority. Jurisdiction, the applicable version and any constitutional remedy require separate assessment. ↩